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Before:  AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges 
 
   
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
James S. Biear, a federal prisoner, seeks information 
from various federal agencies under the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”).1  The Criminal Division of 
Appellee Department of Justice (the “Criminal Division”) and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation are among these agencies. 
Biear requested “[a]ny and all documents and electronic media 
assembled during any investigation (or review) containing the 
name James S. Biear (aka J. Steven Biear and James C. Biear), 
DOB: [REDACTED], SSN: [REDACTED].”2  
                                              
1 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
2 See, e.g., App. at 85.  The Magistrate Judge, in his report and 
recommendation, redacted Biear’s date of birth and Social 
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The Criminal Division replied to Biear’s request by 
requiring him to certify his identity and to submit additional 
information regarding the records.  Biear completed the 
certification of his identity, but did not further detail his 
request.  The Criminal Division then denied Biear’s request.  
Biear appealed to the Office of Information Policy (“OIP”), 
which affirmed the denial.  It concluded that Biear failed to 
provide sufficient information for the Division to identify the 
records sought by Biear. 
 
The FBI initially denied Biear’s request because all 
responsive records were contained in an active investigative 
file and were, therefore, exempt from disclosure.3  After Biear 
filed his complaint in the District Court, the FBI reopened and 
resumed processing Biear’s FOIA request on the ground that 
the criminal investigation had concluded.  The FBI produced 
some documents to Biear in full, some with redactions, and 
others were withheld as duplicative or containing exempt 
information that could not be reasonably segregated from non-
exempt information. 
 
The District Court dismissed Biear’s claim regarding 
his Criminal Division request for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, concluding that he failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies when he refused to reformulate his request and 
therefore “perfect” it.  The District Court found that Biear’s 
challenge was moot with regard to the FBI request because the 
FBI subsequently produced documents.  For the following 
reasons, we conclude that Biear exhausted his administrative 
                                              
Security number under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).  See App. at A-
4.  We redact that information here as well. 
3 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). 
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remedies with respect to his Criminal Division request and that 
his challenge to the FBI’s response was not mooted by the 




A. Biear’s Requests 
Biear is a federal prisoner incarcerated at USP Canaan 
in Wayne County, Pennsylvania.  Biear mailed a series of 
FOIA requests to eight components of the Department of 
Justice: the Bureau of Prisons, the Criminal Division, the FBI, 
the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the United 
States Marshals Service, the Civil Division of the Department 
of Justice, the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, and 
INTERPOL Washington. 
 
Biear’s requests were mailed on various dates in 
December 2012 and January 2013 and, with the exclusion of 
the request to the Bureau of Prisons, sought: “Any and all 
documents and electronic media assembled during any 
investigation (or review) containing the name James S. Biear 
(aka J. Steven Biear and James C. Biear), DOB [REDACTED], 
SSN: [REDACTED].”4 
 
 Only Biear’s requests to the Criminal Division and the 
FBI are at issue here.  Biear has not claimed before us that the 
District Court erred with respect to the other requests. 
 
                                              
4 See, e.g., App. at 85. 
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B. The Criminal Division Request 
Biear submitted two separate but identical requests to 
the Criminal Division.  In January 2013, the Criminal Division 
sent separate responses to Biear regarding each request.  In 
both responses, the Criminal Division sent a letter advising 
Biear that verification of his identity and additional 
information regarding the records sought were required to 
process his request.  The letter advised Biear that his request 
would be administratively closed if the required information 
was not provided within thirty days. 
 
Biear submitted a completed Certification of Identity 
form, but submitted no additional information describing the 
records he sought.  In March 2013, the Criminal Division 
notified Biear by letter that although it received his 
Certification of Identity form, his request was being 
administratively closed because Biear failed to provide a 
specific description of the subject of his request.  Specifically, 
Biear failed to identify the Criminal Division section he 
believed would have or maintain responsive records, 
precluding a search for such records.  In its letter, the Criminal 
Division provided: “If you construe this response to be a denial 
of your request, you may administratively appeal . . . .”5 
 
In April 2013, Biear appealed the disposition of both 
Criminal Division requests to OIP, which handles 
administrative appeals from the Department of Justice’s 
determinations under FOIA.6  OIP affirmed the disposition of 
Biear’s request in September 2013 on the ground that the 
                                              
5 App. at A-90. 
6 See 28 C.F.R. § 16.8(a).   
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Criminal Division properly informed Biear that it required 
further specification to process his response. It specifically 
cited Biear’s failure to indicate the section of Criminal 
Division he believed would maintain responsive records. 
C. The FBI Request 
Biear submitted a request to the FBI in December 2012.  
In January 2013, the FBI advised Biear it would require him to 
verify his identity and provide additional information 
regarding the records sought to process his request.  Biear 
complied in March 2013.  The FBI acknowledged receipt in 
April 2013 and advised Biear that it had begun searching for 
responsive records. 
 
Thereafter, Biear sent a letter to OIP to preemptively 
appeal the anticipated denial of the FBI request.  This letter was 
identical to the letters sent appealing his Criminal Division 
requests.  OIP acknowledged the letter in April 2013. 
 
In May 2013, the FBI informed Biear by letter that all 
responsive records were contained in an active investigative 
file and exempt from disclosure under FOIA.7  A month later, 
OIP informed Biear via letter that, because the FBI had 
reopened and resumed processing his request, his appeal had 
been closed as moot.  The reopening and processing referenced 
in the OIP letter led to the determination that all responsive 
records were contained in an active investigative file. 
 
In July 2013, Biear requested that OIP reopen his appeal 
of the denial of the FBI request because the FBI had “remained 
                                              
7 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).   
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silent.”8  OIP advised Biear in September 2013 that it construed 
his letter as a new administrative appeal.  OIP further advised 
Biear that this appeal had been closed because the FBI had 
responded to Biear’s request in May. 
 
Biear then requested the production of a Vaughn index, 
an itemized index specifying the basis for withholding on a 
document-by-document basis.9  Based on the record, OIP 
never responded to this letter. 
 
Thereafter, the FBI reopened and resumed processing 
Biear’s request in October 2014, after the commencement of 
this action in the District Court, on the ground that the criminal 
investigative file was no longer active and the applicable 
exemption no longer applied.  On November 25, 2014, and 
December 22, 2014, the FBI produced a total of 1,188 pages of 
responsive records; 162 pages were released in full, 670 pages 
were released with redactions, 197 pages were withheld as 
duplicative of other pages in the production, and 159 pages 
                                              
8 App. at A-107.  Biear asserts on appeal that he did not receive 
the May letter advising him of the FBI’s claimed exemption 
from production.  Appellants’ Br. at 8.  Although this 
contention does not impact our analysis, it contextualizes 
Biear’s July 23, 2013, statement regarding the FBI’s purported 
silence. 
9 See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827–28 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973).  A  Vaughn index generally is not required for 
withholding under the active investigation exemption.  See 
N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 218–23 
(1978) (“[A] particularized, case-by-case showing is neither 




were withheld in full because non-exempt information 
contained therein could not reasonably be segregated from 
exempt information. 
 
 The FBI’s Production 
 
The FBI’s production, Bates-labeled in sequence as 
“Biear-1” through “Biear-1188,” indicated which pages were 
withheld or redacted.  It also explained why pages were 
withheld and redactions were made: the FBI broke down each 
applicable FOIA exemption into subcategories, which were 
assigned codes that were then affixed to the withheld or 
redacted pages to explain which exemption applied to which 
withholding or redaction. 
 
Where pages were withheld entirely, they were replaced 
with a “Deleted Page Information Sheet,” which identified the 
reason for withholding by noting the applicable FOIA 
exemption relied upon.  Where pages contained redactions, the 
reason for withholding and the applicable FOIA exemption 
relied upon were noted on the face of the released pages. 
 
Biear has not specifically appealed the FBI’s 
withholding of portions of the records responsive to his 
request. 
 
D. The District Court Proceedings 
 
Biear filed his complaint pro se in the District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania on July 31, 2014.  The 
government filed two motions to dismiss or in the alternative 
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for summary judgment,10 and Biear cross-moved for summary 
judgment.  The motions were referred to a Magistrate Judge, 
who issued a comprehensive report and recommendation.  The 
report recommended granting the government’s motion 
dismissing the complaint and denying Biear’s cross-motion. 
   
It also recommended that Biear’s claim against OIP’s 
disposition of his Criminal Division request be dismissed 
because Biear failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
when he declined to provide additional information to identify 
the records he sought. The report recommended that, because 
the FBI resumed processing Biear’s request and produced 
documents after the commencement of Biear’s action, his 
claim regarding the FBI request be dismissed as moot.  Biear, 
still proceeding pro se, made handwritten objections, to which 
the government responded. 
 
 The District Court issued an order adopting the report 
and recommendation and overruling Biear’s objections.  It 
dismissed Biear’s claim regarding his Criminal Division 
request for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and his 
claim regarding his FBI request as moot.  It is not clear whether 
the dismissal of Biear’s claim regarding his Criminal Division 
request adjudicated the government’s motion to dismiss or its 
motion for summary judgment.  This appeal followed.  Pro 
bono counsel was appointed to represent Biear. 
                                              
10 One motion was filed on behalf of the FBI and another on 
behalf of the seven other entities under the Department of 
Justice: at the time the initial motion was filed, the FBI was 
reprocessing Biear’s request, leading to a different factual 
posture.  The motion on behalf of the non-FBI agencies was 




A. The Criminal Division Request 
Biear argues that the District Court erred in dismissing 
his claim regarding his Criminal Division request because he 
in fact did exhaust administrative remedies when he appealed 
the closure of his request to OIP.  The government contends 
that, because Biear did not provide further information to 
specify the records sought by his request such as the sections 
of the Criminal Division that he believed would have 
responsive records, Biear failed to perfect his request and 
therefore never made a proper request under FOIA.  This, the 
government argues, precludes exhaustion.  Biear’s request was 
sufficiently specific, however, and Biear did not need to further 
narrow it to “perfect” it.  We therefore conclude that Biear did 
exhaust his administrative remedies. 
                                              
11 The District Court’s order dismissing all of Biear’s claims is 
a final decision, reviewable by the Court of Appeals under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
determination that a plaintiff exhausted or failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  See Ellison v. Rogers, 484 F.3d 658, 
660 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We have plenary review over the District 
Court’s exhaustion determination.”); Holoway v. Horn, 355 
F.3d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We conduct a plenary review 
of the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual 
conclusions for clear error.”).  We review decisions of 
mootness under a plenary standard of review.  Int’l Bhd. of 
Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(“Questions of mootness are considered under a plenary 
standard of review.”). 
11 
 
FOIA permits petitioners to request documents from 
government agencies.  Agencies, including the Department of 
Justice, make and publish regulations governing requests under 
FOIA.12  Requests under FOIA are proper if they “reasonably” 
describe the records sought and are made “in accordance with 
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and 
procedures to be followed.”13 
 
 Generally, the law requires exhaustion of administrative 
remedies before a plaintiff may seek relief in district court.14  
In the context of FOIA, courts in the D.C. Circuit, which 
frequently adjudicate issues arising under FOIA, have held that 
the “failure to comply with an agency’s FOIA regulations is 
                                              
12 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (requiring agencies to make and 
publish regulations for requests under FOIA); 28 C.F.R. § 16.3 
(Department of Justice regulations governing FOIA requests). 
13 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(a); see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
754–55 (1989) (describing requirement of request under 
FOIA). 
14 See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (“The 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well 
established in the jurisprudence of administrative law . . . .  
The doctrine provides ‘that no one is entitled to judicial relief 
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed 
administrative remedy has been exhausted.’”) (internal 
citations omitted); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 
61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying exhaustion requirement to 
FOIA); see also McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1240 
(3d Cir. 1993) (applying Oglesby in Third Circuit). 
12 
 
the equivalent of a failure to exhaust,” which subjects a case to 
dismissal.15 
 
 Biear’s claim regarding his Criminal Division request 
turns on whether he complied with the Department of Justice’s 
FOIA regulations.  With respect to the identification of records 
sought, the Department of Justice’s FOIA regulations state: 
 
Requesters must describe the 
records sought in sufficient detail 
to enable Department personnel to 
locate them with a reasonable 
amount of effort. To the extent 
possible, requesters should include 
specific information that may 
assist a component in identifying 
the requested records, such as the 
date, title or name, author, 
recipient, subject matter of the 
record, case number, file 
designation, or reference 
number.16 
 The government contends that Biear’s request was 
insufficiently detailed, in part because it failed to suggest 
specific sections in which responsive records might be 
maintained.  The text of the regulation does not require that a 
request contain that information.  It states only that a request 
should contain that information “[t]o the extent possible.”   In 
                                              
15 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 261 F. 
Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2017). 
16 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(b). 
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contrast, the preceding sentence states that the requester “must 
describe the records in sufficient detail.”  Biear requested the 
records that specifically reference him: he provided his name, 
date of birth, and Social Security number to facilitate locating 
responsive records. 
 
 “Containing” Versus “Relating” 
Biear’s request is sufficiently specific to meet the 
requirements of the Department of Justice’s regulations and 
FOIA because he requested records “containing” his name, not 
“relating to” him. 
 
Two cases illustrate the issue: Dale v. Internal Revenue 
Service17 and Shapiro v. Central Intelligence Agency.18  Both 
cases agree that “the linchpin inquiry is whether the agency is 
able to determine precisely what records are being 
requested.”19  The government contends that the relevant 
distinction between the two cases is that the plaintiff in Shapiro 
requested files from specific databases, whereas in Dale the 
plaintiff did not.  This is not the relevant distinction between 
the two cases.  
 
In Dale, where the plaintiff requested any and all 
documents “that refer or relate in any way” to him, the district 
court concluded that the request was not sufficiently precise.20  
In Shapiro, where the plaintiff requested “all documents 
                                              
17 238 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 2002). 
18 170 F. Supp. 3d 147 (D.D.C. 2016). 
19 Dale, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Shapiro, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 154. 
20 Id. at 104–05. 
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mentioning Nelson Mandela,” the district court determined 
that the request was sufficiently precise.21  Shapiro explained 
the pertinent distinction: 
 
Regardless of how onerous it 
might be to locate them, there can 
be no dispute about which items 
are being requested—records in 
the CIA’s possession that 
“mention[ ]” Nelson Mandela or 
his three listed aliases . . . . Here, 
the subject of Shapiro’s request is 
the entirety of each document that 
mentions Mandela, even if such 
references are fleeting and 
tangential. So compliance should 
involve virtually no guesswork: A 
record is responsive if and only if 
it contains Mandela’s name (or 
those of his three listed aliases) or 
any descriptor obviously referring 
to him.22 
The district court in Shapiro contrasted this request with 
requests that seek records “pertaining” and “relating” to 
subjects, finding that “in most of those cases, the reviewing 
agency’s task was anything but ministerial” due to the 
subjectivity of what it means for a document to relate to a 
subject.23  It did not concern itself with the specification of 
                                              
21 Shapiro, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 154. 




databases.  We note that an individual making a FOIA request 
would almost definitionally be someone outside of the agency 
containing the records.  It would be counterintuitive in the 
extreme to require such an individual to have sufficient 
knowledge of an agency’s organizational units to be able to 
identify the specific units of an agency that might contain the 
records sought. 
 
In fact, the Shapiro court rejected a very similar 
argument to the government’s position.  In Shapiro, as here, 
the government argued that the FOIA request would not allow 
agency personnel “to locate the record with a reasonable 
amount of effort.”24  Biear, who requested records containing 
his name and identifying information and not pertaining to 
him, falls under the reasoning of Shapiro, not Dale.  Because 
Biear’s request was sufficiently specific, he exhausted his 
administrative remedies and the District Court erred by finding 
he did not.  We will reverse the District Court’s judgment with 
respect to Biear’s Criminal Division request.  
 
B. The FBI Request 
The District Court, adopting the report and 
recommendation, dismissed Biear’s claim regarding his FBI 
request as moot because, after the commencement of Biear’s 
action, the FBI produced documents to him. Biear, who 
contends that the FBI failed to provide sufficient rationale for 
its decision to redact and withhold certain pages of the 
                                              
24 Id. at 155 (citation omitted); cf. Appellee Supp. Br. at 16–
17 (citing identical “reasonable amount of effort” language in 
28 C.F.R. § 16.3(b)). 
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production, argues that his claim is not moot where there exist 
unresolved issues such as the one he raises. 
 
Biear is correct.  The District Court should have 
continued to exercise jurisdiction over Biear’s claim regarding 
the sufficiency of the FBI’s response to his request.  In Baker 
v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,25 a case relied on by 
the government and Biear alike, the district court found that 
“‘where an agency has released documents, but other related 
issue[s] remain unresolved, courts frequently will not dismiss 
the action as moot.’”26  The District Court for the District of 
Columbia, citing the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, has 
concluded that a court retains jurisdiction of a case arising 
under FOIA “if it is not convinced that the agency has released 
all nonexempt material.”27 
 
Moreover, “[i]n determining the adequacy of a FOIA 
disclosure, the burden of sustaining an agency’s determination 
rests with the agency.”28  Here, the Magistrate Judge concluded 
                                              
25 No. 11 Civ. 588, 2012 WL 245963 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2012). 
26 Id. at *4 (quoting McKinley v. FDIC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 105, 
110 (D.D.C. 2010)). 
27 Northwestern Univ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 403 F. 
Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 
121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
28 Baker, 2012 WL 245963, at *4; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(B) 
(“[T]he court shall determine the matter de novo, and may 
examine the contents of such agency records in camera to 
determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be 
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection 




that, even if Biear had amended his complaint to challenge the 
adequacy of the FBI’s production, the production of documents 
obliged Biear to appeal the adequacy of the FBI’s disclosure 
administratively before pursuing a judicial remedy.  The report 
and recommendation relies on McDonnell v. United States,29 
which held that production revived the administrative 
exhaustion requirement where the agency’s production 
predates the lawsuit.30  
 
Biear filed suit before the FBI made its production, 
distinguishing this case from McDonnell.  The adequacy of the 
FBI’s production only became an issue ripe for consideration 
when the action had already commenced in the District Court.  
In fact, the government had already moved to dismiss the 
claims regarding Biear’s requests to the other agencies when 
the FBI began producing documents.  By adopting the 
Magistrate Judge’s rationale, which misapplied McDonnell to 
a case where the lawsuit predated production, the District 
Court erred.  To apply McDonnell to this case would create a 
rule under which a plaintiff may commence an action in which 
the courts have subject-matter jurisdiction because he has, at 
the time of commencement, exhausted his administrative 
remedies, only for the actions of the defendant to effectively 
“unexhaust” the plaintiff’s remedies by subsequent action and 
deprive the courts of subject-matter jurisdiction in the middle 
of a proceeding. 
 
Because Biear’s lawsuit was underway when the 
adequacy of the FBI’s disclosure became ripe for disposition, 
the District Court should have continued to exercise 
                                              
29 4 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1993). 
30 Id. at 1240 
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jurisdiction over the issue and declined to dismiss it as moot.  
We will reverse the District Court’s judgment with respect to 
the FBI request and remand for further proceedings. 
 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s judgment with respect to the Criminal Division and 
FBI requests, affirm the judgment with respect to the other 
requests, and remand for further proceedings. 
